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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Book Reviews
EL PLAN DE EsTuDIo DE ABOGACIA, by Carlos Cossio. Buenos Aires: L. J.
Rosso, 1933. Pp. 130.
To a North American law student the argument of this little book would
seem strange, for it contends for a policy in law education just the opposite
of the one that we find active in this country. After tracing the history of
law teaching and law curricula in Argentina from their beginnings in 1822,
the author summarizes the present practice and proposes a radical depar-
ture. In Argentina the purpose of training in law has been much more
nearly the aim we have in teaching the social sciences-to train political
and administrative leaders of the nation. In fact, the law school of Buenos
Aires has been almost a major department of the Argentine government.
The instruction has included political science, history, sociology, economics,
and the philosophy of law. In a word, it has been, as the author says,
encyclopaedic and socially pragmatic. The practical training of attorneys
has suffered in comparison with the training of men of public affairs. The
author proposes that all this should be changed and that technical training
in the law and in its practice should become the chief, almost the exclusive,
function of law schools; these latter should turn out well-equipped lawyers
rather than politicians and future statesmen. But he would retain courses
in the philosophy of law. His proposed revised law curriculum would read
as follows: (1) General Science of Law, (2) Gnosology and Metaphysics,
(3) Elements of Positive Law, (4) Fundamentals of Constitutional Law,
(5) Ethics and Esthetics, (6) Real Property, (7) Penal Law, (8) Obliga-
tions, (9 Criminal Procedure and Judicial Organization, (10) Philosophy
of Law, (11) Contracts I, (12) Taxation, (13) Civil Procedure, (14)
Marine Law, (15) Philosophy of History and Social Philosophy, (16) Con-
tracts II, (17) Public Services, (18) Family Law, (19) Private Interna-
tional Law. The two aims of the course would be practical and humanistic.
In addition to regular technical courses he would have the school conduct
(1) practice work (now largely neglected) and (2) seminars on the finding
and use of the law. While we are moving in the direction of a greater
socialization and broadening of the law curriculum, Argentina is agitating
for greater technical efficiency.
L. L. BERNARD.
Washington University.
LA REVOLUCI6N Y LA INTEGRACI6N DE LA TEORIA PURA DEL DERECHO. By
Ca'los Cossio. Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1935. Pp. 41.
The professor of the Philosophy of Law in the national university of La
Plata, stimulated by constitutional problems growing out of recent Argen-
tine revolutions, raises the question of the legality of revolutionary govern-
ments and of the sanctions necessary to render them legal. As an adherent
of the nen-Kantian school of legal philosophy, he takes his point of depar-
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ture from the viewpoints of del Vecchio and Kelsen, but proceeds inde-
pendently to the conclusion that anything short of a total revolution leaves
the institutions of the country nominally under the tutelage of the existing
fundamental laws, but actually the processes of revolution tend, like any
other events, to create a variant and hypothetical unwritten constitution
which serves as the real fundamental law until the old constitution is
amended through the ordinary legal channels. The new political regime
may be legitimated either by international recognition (the normal method,
since international sanctions are of a higher order of rational, if not of
constituted, authority) or by national sanction, through the valuntary ad-
justment of other continuing institutions (including the courts and the
constitution) to the newly developing unwritten constitution. Thus, in real-
ity, the author views revolution merely as a normal, though unusual and
non-parliamentary, method of revising constitutions and of changing the
order and personnel of governments. That his views will not receive unani-
mous approval goes without saying, but his viewpoint seems to be growing.
L. L. BERNARD.
Washington University.
RoaER B. TANEY. By Carl Brent Swisher. The Macmillan Company.
New York, 1935. Pp. x, 608.
Successively, each invalidation by the Supreme Court of the more bold
of the New Deal measures has been branded, by the more indignant of the
critics of the Court as "another Dred Scott decision." Current controversy
relative to the practicability of the American doctrine of judicial supremacy
is more heated now than at any time since that decision and such generally
related decisions as Ableman v. Booth and Ex Parte Merryman aroused in
the North a profound antagonism towards and distrust in the Supreme
Court. Historically, the parallel is striking. Mr. Roosevelt's opinion that
the Schechter decision returned the nation to the "horse and buggy age" is
quite comparable to President Lincoln's statement, in his inaugural address,
that if the policy of the government upon vital questions is to be irrevocably
fixed by the Supreme Court, "the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the
hands of that eminent tribunal."
Similarly one need not draw the long bow in comparison to detect a
clear resemblance between Horace Greeley's statement that the Dred Scott
decision was entitled only to the weight to be given to the judgment of the
congregation in any Washington barroom and Secretary Wallace's condem-
nation of the Supreme Court's order for the return of the impounded
processing taxes as "a steal." History has indeed repeated itself. No more
opportune time for the appearance of a really satisfactory biography of
the most criticized judge in American history could well be conceived.
The worth of Roger Brooke Taney as a politician and as a judge has
been wholly reestimated by modern historians. Associated as he was with
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